Is it time to phase out UNDESA’s regional criterion of development? by Ingleby, David et al.
                          Ingleby, D., Singleton, A., & Wickramage, K. (2019). Is it time to phase out
UNDESA’s regional criterion of development? International Migration.
https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12582
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY
Link to published version (if available):
10.1111/imig.12582
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Wiley at
https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12582 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
Is it Time to Phase Out UNDESA’s Regional
Criterion of Development?
David Ingleby*, Ann Singleton** and Kolitha Wickramage***
ABSTRACT
International migration to developing countries has attracted increasing attention because of its
growing volume in absolute terms and its potential contribution to development. However,
conclusions about what is happening in these countries depend crucially on the way migration
and development are measured and analysed. This article shows that whether migrant stocks
appear to be increasing or decreasing in developing countries depends on three factors:
whether a regional or an economic criterion of “development” is used, whether volume is
expressed in absolute numbers or as a percentage of total population, and whether the data
include refugees and asylum seekers. The policy implications of these ﬁndings, which – due
to the shortcomings of available data – can only be regarded as provisional, are then dis-
cussed. Better quality migration data and analysis informed by the limitations of the data are
needed to provide a sound evidence base for current debates about migration policy.
INTRODUCTION
In 1996 the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) classiﬁed
Japan, Australia, New Zealand and all countries in North America and Europe as “developed” and
all others as “developing” (UNDESA, 1996), adopting a categorization that had been used by the
United Nations Population Division (UNDP) since 1970. This list of countries was not regarded as
precise and authoritative: indeed, because there are so many competing views about how develop-
ment should be deﬁned and measured, it never could have been. “Development” is a prime exam-
ple of what philosophers call an “essentially contested concept” (Gallie, 1956). UNDESA’s
categorisation was therefore accompanied by emphatic disclaimers: “There is no established con-
vention for the designation of “developed” and “developing” countries or areas in the United
Nations system” (ibid, p. ii), and “The designations “developed” and “developing” are intended for
statistical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgement about the stage reached by a
particular country or area in the development process” (ibid, p. 21).
In the half century since it was ﬁrst used, however, this regional classiﬁcation seems to have
taken root: despite the above disclaimers, it has become de facto an “established convention”. The
only change has been the replacement of the labels “developed/developing” by “more developed”/
“less developed”. Unfortunately, as this article will show, the world has changed so much in the
meantime that conclusions based on this classiﬁcation can be highly misleading. Indeed, there is
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something self-contradictory about identifying a country’s developmental level with its geographic
location: locations are ﬁxed, while development by its very nature involves change.
A widely used alternative is the World Bank’s classiﬁcation of countries in terms of Gross
National Income (GNI) per capita. This criterion, too, cannot claim to be authoritative: the World
Bank itself acknowledges repeatedly that “classiﬁcation by income does not necessarily reﬂect
development status”. Firstly, GNI is only one of many available indicators of economic strength
and may not be the most useful one for studying a given phenomenon. More fundamentally, how-
ever, the 1990 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1990) challenged the very idea that develop-
ment could be reduced to economic growth, proposing instead a multidimensional measure, the
Human Development Index (HDI). In its 2013 World Migration Report (IOM, 2013), the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration compared ﬁndings on migration and development using all three
indicators, showing that they could lead to very different results.
A full discussion of the issues surrounding the deﬁnition and measurement of development is
beyond the scope of this article. Its aim is conﬁned to showing that very different conclusions
about migration1 in developing countries can result from using the World Bank’s economic crite-
rion instead of UNDESA’s regional one.
While fully appreciating the limitations of a purely economic measure of “development”, we sug-
gest that the World Bank’s criterion is suitable in four ways for exploring links between develop-
ment and migration:
• It is practical and widely used; UNDESA itself uses it to supplement its own regional criterion.
• Although it lacks an explicit human-rights dimension, it does have an implicit one: the UN
Bill of Rights (UN, 1948) established that a country unable to provide for the material needs
of its inhabitants is already denying them their human rights.
• The fact that GNI does not capture political rights within its metric is arguably an advantage
when studying migration. De Haas (2010:39) demonstrated in a multivariate regression anal-
ysis of global migration data that a lack of political freedoms in destination countries is sig-
niﬁcantly associated with higher immigration when other relevant factors are controlled for.
If this is so, including political rights in an indicator of development would reduce, not
increase, its ability to predict immigration.
• The World Bank reclassiﬁes GNI levels each year and thus provides an up-to-date measure.
Although the UNDESA criterion might have functioned reasonably well during the previous cen-
tury as a rule of thumb for distinguishing the global “haves” from the “have-nots”, recent decades
have seen vigorous economic growth in several regions. Much of this has taken place in countries
that UNDESA classiﬁes as “less developed” – often to such a degree as to propel the country con-
cerned into the “high-income” category. As a result, the discrepancy between results obtained using
UNDESA and World Bank criteria is increasing. The proportion of countries classiﬁed as “high-
income” was 20 per cent in 1990, but reached 35 per cent in 2015.
In addition, some countries were classiﬁed in 1996 by UNDESA as “more developed” despite having
GNIs below the “high-income” threshold. However, more and more of these countries are qualifying as
“high-income”, so that this source of discrepancies is diminishing. Most of the anomalies are now due to
newly rich countries in “less developed” regions (comprising 9% of the latter countries in 1990 but 21%
in 2015), which UNDESA cannot reclassify for the simple reason that they are in the wrong place.
ANALYSES
The data analysed in this article come from two main sources. Data on global migrant stocks from
1990 – 2015 were taken from the UNDESA 2017 Revision (UNDESA, 2017a), which includes data
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from 257 countries. It would have been preferable to analyse ﬂows rather than changes in stocks,
but sufﬁciently complete datasets on ﬂows are not currently available. Data on GNI levels and the
corresponding codes were taken from the World Bank (2018), which by 2015 had classiﬁed 218
countries (i.e. all World Bank member countries and all other economies with populations of more
than 30,000). The analyses undertaken here involved only applying simple arithmetic to these
data.2
Divergence between UNDESA and World Bank classiﬁcations
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs contrasts “more developed” with “less
developed” regions (which we shall abbreviate henceforth as MD and LD), while the World Bank
distinguishes “high” and “low- or middle” income countries (HICs and LMICs). As Figure 1
shows, this yields four possible combinations of the two criteria. Further subdivisions of these
FIGURE 1
INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT STOCK IN 2015 IN THE FOUR DIFFERENT TYPES OF COUNTRY,
GROUPED ACCORDING TO UNDESA AND WORLD BANK CRITERIA
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categories exist, but the analyses reported here are based only on these dichotomies. Table 1 (at the
end of this article) lists the main countries in each of the four categories.
If the two classiﬁcations were very similar, the “slices” in this pie chart corresponding to concor-
dant classiﬁcations (i.e. those coloured brown and purple) would be far larger than those represent-
ing discordant ones (yellow and blue). We can see, however, that this is not the case. Figure 1 also
shows the difference between the ways in which the UNDESA and World Bank criteria divide the
“pie” in two.
The size of the slices (i.e. the proportion of the world’s migrants in each type of country), start-
ing with HICs in LD regions and moving clockwise, is 15%, 49%, 8% and 28%. This means that
countries with discordant classiﬁcations housed (15% + 8% = ) 23% of all migrants. Of the
(15% + 28% =) 43% of migrants located in LD regions, just over one-third were in HICs (includ-
ing for example the “Asian Tigers” such as Singapore and the oil-rich countries of the Gulf Coop-
eration Council). These countries play a pivotal role: as we shall see, their inclusion in UN
DESA’s LD category is the main reason for the widespread belief that migrant stock in the devel-
oping world is increasing. Figure 1 also shows that in 2015, most international migrants
(49% + 8%, i.e. 57%) were located in UNDESA’s MD regions, although 14% of them lived in
LMICs. Between 1990 and 2015 this group of countries declined from 25 to 12. The Russian Fed-
eration, home to nearly 5% of the world’s migrants, is the largest country in this group: it brieﬂy
crossed the “high-income” threshold from 2012 to 2014, but due to the fall in oil and gas prices in
2014 and other factors it then returned to the LMIC category. The other 11 members of the group
in 2015 were all located in the European region and belonged formerly to the USSR, the Warsaw
Pact or the Soviet sphere of inﬂuence.
Clearly, the UNDESA and World Bank classiﬁcations cannot be regarded as interchangeable;
they measure very different things. We will ﬁrst examine the difference it makes to “slice the pie”
in the two ways shown in Figure 1.
Changes in migrant stock in each type of country
Figure 2 uses the same colours as Figure 1 and adds the time dimension. It shows that between
1990 and 2015, HICs in MD regions (purple) housed continuously increasing numbers of migrants.
FIGURE 2
CHANGES IN MIGRANT STOCK IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF COUNTRY
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An increase is also seen within HICs in LD regions (yellow), particularly between 2000 and 2010.
Within LMICs in MD regions (blue), migrant stock was low and fell slightly, while LMICs in LD
regions (brown) – home in 2015 to 81% of the world’s population – showed a slight decline until
2005, followed by an increase.
However, these absolute ﬁgures can be misleading, because the number of countries and thus the
total population in each category changes over time. Rising migrant stock in HICs within LD
regions might simply reﬂect the fact that the number of such countries increased from 13 to 34,
while falling stock in LMICs within MD regions could be caused by their decrease from 25 to 12.
Moreover, population size within each type of country changes due to natural growth or decline
and inward or outward migration.
It is therefore important to take the total population of each area into account when consider-
ing the number of migrants that it houses. The fact that migrant stocks in LD regions are
approaching the volume of those in MD ones takes on an entirely different signiﬁcance when we
bear in mind that the population of the ﬁrst area is about ﬁve times greater than that of the sec-
ond and increasing ﬁve times more rapidly. Alongside absolute numbers of migrant stock, there-
fore, we should always examine “migrant density”, that is the percentage of migrants in the total
population of each area. (This indicator is routinely included in UNDESA data on migrant stock.)
Figure 3 shows what happens when the absolute totals represented in Figure 2 are converted to
migrant density.
Using this measure, the highest ﬁgures are found in HICs within LD regions (yellow). A sudden
drop is visible between 1990 and 1995: in 1990 this group comprised only 13 countries, but in
1995 it was joined by (among others) South Korea, with a very large population but comparatively
few migrants. It is this that mainly accounts for the sudden fall in migrant density in that year. A
slight fall is also visible after 2010, perhaps reﬂecting the end of the “golden decade” of rapid
growth in the so-called “emerging markets” (Didier et al., 2015).
High-income countries in MD regions (purple) show a steady increase over the whole period,
while migrant density in LMICs in LD regions (brown) is low and declines slightly. In LMICs
within MD regions (blue), migrant density varies very little.
Figure 4 returns to the dichotomies underlying the UNDESA and World Bank classiﬁcations,
that is the different ways of “slicing the pie”, aggregating countries either according to income
levels (HIC vs. LMIC) or regions (MD vs. LD).
FIGURE 3
CHANGES IN MIGRANT DENSITY IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF COUNTRY
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Both MD regions and HICs show a steady increase in migrant density, which is more pro-
nounced when the economic criterion is used. Concerning the lower lines, both LD regions and
LMICs have very low migrant densities, in the ﬁrst place because their populations are far greater.
In order to see the changes in these lines more clearly, it is necessary to enlarge the scale of Fig-
ure 4 and omit the upper lines, as is done in Figure 5.
This graph is the most important one for our argument and shows some striking differences.
Firstly, using the regional classiﬁcation, LD regions (blue) show a U-shaped curve, but using the
World Bank’s economic classiﬁcation, the line for LMICs (green) only turns upwards between
2010 and 2015.
More insight into what is going on can be obtained by removing refugees3 from the ﬁgures for
migrant stock: the broken lines show the resulting migrant densities. When studying the relationship
between migration and development, it is preferable to exclude forced migration because its causes
and economic impacts are for the most part very different. In LMICs and LD regions, refugees formed
FIGURE 4
CHANGES IN MIGRANT DENSITY MEASURED USING GEOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CRITERIA
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a considerable proportion of all migrants in 2015 (22.1% and 18.3% respectively, in contrast to 2.1%
and 2.6% in HICs and MD regions). As a result, the broken lines are much lower than the unbroken
ones. Using the UNDESA classiﬁcation (blue lines), migrant density falls at ﬁrst but then increases –
yet with the World Bank classiﬁcation (green lines), it falls continuously when refugees are excluded.
The large number of refugees in 2015 is thus the only reason why migrant density in LMICs shows an
increase in that year. Without them, migrant density in LMICs continues its decline.
Particularly when refugees are excluded, the two criteria thus show very different trends over
time. Whereas migrant density increases in LD regions after 2000, LMICs show a steady decline.
The main reason for the ﬁrst result turns out to be the inclusion in the category LD of a fast-grow-
ing group of countries that have joined the “high-income” category and attract many migrants. This
can be seen from the fact that when these newly rich countries are excluded from the LD category,
as shown by the lowest line in Figure 3, migrant density declines.
As others have already noted (OECD 2016:84), it is mainly the inclusion of HICs in the LD cate-
gory that is responsible for the widely shared perception that migration to these countries is becoming
more common. It is quite true that both absolute numbers and migrant density in LD regions have
been increasing since 2005, but as Figure 3 shows, this is only thanks to a small but growing number
of prosperous and migrant-rich countries located there. In LMICs within LD regions, migrant density
in 2015 was twenty times lower than in the HICs located there (1,2% as against 24%), having declined
steadily from 1990 to 2010 (or 2015 if refugees are excluded). Whereas the total population of these
LMICs increased from 1990 to 2015 by 44%, the increase in their migrant stock was only 13% (which
becomes 9% when refugees are excluded). Table 1 at the end of this article shows summary statistics
for 1990 and 2015 that allow these conclusions to be checked.
On reﬂection, we should not be at all surprised to ﬁnd that migrant density in the steadily declin-
ing number of countries classiﬁed as LMIC is not increasing. When a country’s prosperity
increases it is transferred to the HIC category, taking its migrant population (which will usually be
more dense than that of most LMICs) with it. If ﬁsh in a pool are removed as soon as they grow
large, those left behind will remain small.
Nevertheless, the ﬁnding is still in one sense remarkable. Four out of ﬁve people in the world
live in LMICs in LD regions, so it might be thought that combining their data with those from the
much smaller number of HICs in the same regions could not greatly affect the overall ﬁndings.
After all, these HICs house a mere 2% of the non-migrant population of LD regions. For the
migrant population, however, the corresponding ﬁgure is 34%, because migrant density in these
very atypical countries is extremely high: some of them contain even more international migrants
than non-migrants. This puts a different complexion on the often-repeated ﬁnding that migrant
stock and density in UNDESA’s “developing regions” are increasing. The consequences for policy-
making are considerable and will be discussed later.
Disaggregating migrant stocks by countries of origin and destination
Up to this point we have examined only the number of migrants in each country, without disaggre-
gating them according to their origin using “bilateral” data. “Origin” is operationalised by
UNDESA as “country of birth”, with some national gaps ﬁlled by other migration or citizenship
data. For simplicity, no account is taken of the fact that some migrants might have lived in one or
more destination countries other than the one they presently live in.
So far we have avoided using the terms “North” and “South” in this article, but this becomes dif-
ﬁcult here because they are used in most discussions of bilateral migration. The disadvantage of
these terms is their ambiguity. Usually, “South” is a synonym for the LD regions and “North” for
the MD ones, but sometimes the terms refer to HICs and LMICs. Because it is not generally rea-
lised how different these classiﬁcations are, not much attention tends to be paid to the precise
Migration and development 7
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deﬁnition. However, we will show that the distinction is particularly important when we examine
bilateral migration.
Of course, data on migrant stocks and bilateral data complement each other: the sum of migrants
from different origins must be equal to total migrant stock. The ﬁnding that migrant stocks in the
South (deﬁned according to UNDESA’s categorisation) have increased, therefore suggests that
South-South migration is likely to have increased too. (It is hard to see where else the additional
migrants could have come from: ﬁve times more people live in the South than the North, while
large-scale emigration from North to South seems unlikely.) It therefore comes as no surprise that
bilateral data based on the UNDESA criterion show an increasing ratio of South-South to South-
North migration – prompting the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to announce
at the General Assembly in September 2017 that “South-South migration exceeds South-North
migration, despite stereotypes” (Guterres, 2017).
“South” and “North” can also be deﬁned using the World Bank’s economic criterion: this should
give very different results, because as Figure 4 showed, while migrant density since 2000 has
increased in LD countries, it has decreased in LMICs. When refugees are excluded, the contrast is
even greater. Several sources of bilateral data make this contradiction visible. Firstly, recent
UNDESA publications offer data based on the regional criterion. The 2011 International Migration
Report (UNDESA, 2012:2) states:
As of 2010, the number of migrants who had moved from the less developed regions to the more
developed regions (or “South-to-North” migration) was nearly of the same order of magnitude as
the number of persons who had moved within the less developed regions (or “South-to-South”
migration): 74.3 million compared to 73.2 million.
Figure 3 in a recent issue of Population Facts (UNDESA, 2017b) shows the distribution of interna-
tional migrants by development group (North/South) at origin and destination, covering 2000,
2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017. The same data are represented in our Figure 6: it can be seen that
South-South migration did indeed overtake South-North just after 2010.
Bilateral data classiﬁed in terms of countries’ income levels are more scarce, but they can be
found in the World Bank’s three editions of the World Bank Migration and Remittances Handbook
(World Bank 2008, 2011, 2016), which examine migration data from 2005, 2010 and 2013 respec-
tively. We have used here the bilateral data used in these Handbooks, which has been placed online
FIGURE 6
DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS BY ORIGIN AND DESTINATION USING UNDESA‘S
REGIONAL CRITERION FOR ‘SOUTH’ AND ‘NORTH’
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together with additional data from 2017 (World Bank 2017). We have also used the more accurate
analysis of the 2005 data reported by Ratha and Shaw (2007), in one of the ﬁrst articles to draw
attention to the importance of South-South migration. Figures 6 and 7 show the contrasting results
obtained with the two criteria. Using the World Bank classiﬁcations, South-South migration appears
to be less than South-North and to have increased less rapidly – the opposite of the ﬁndings using
the UNDESA criterion.4
DISCUSSION
These analyses have shown that classifying developmental level on the basis of geographical loca-
tion can result in very misleading conclusions. This is a general problem with most attempts to
equate locations with inequalities. Like global regions, different areas within countries are often
associated with marked inequalities. In towns and cities we speak of living “on the wrong side of
the tracks”, while retailers wishing to predict consumption patterns often collect information about
customers’ postcodes. However, all such rules of thumb can be rendered useless by the phe-
nomenon of change. Neglected regions can be revitalised and run-down city areas can become
“gentriﬁed” – or the opposite may occur. At world level, the increasing globalisation of capital,
goods and – to a lesser extent – labour (Tapinos and Delaunay, 2000) makes it increasingly unreal-
istic to locate wealth and power permanently in particular geographic locations.
Seen in this light, the UNDESA list of MD countries is of mainly historical interest. Like a com-
pass that has become demagnetised, the regional criterion has now become so unreliable that it can
no longer be trusted. Continuing to use it as the basis for policy-making carries the risk of making
grave errors.
Problems of using a changeable rather than ﬁxed classiﬁcation of developmental
level
Allowing classiﬁcations of developmental level to change over time may be more realistic, but it is
accompanied by deﬁnite drawbacks. The great advantage of the UNDESA criterion is (in the
organisation’s own words) its “statistical convenience”, because countries have the habit of staying
FIGURE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS BY ORIGIN AND DESTINATION USING WORLD
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in the same place. If classiﬁcations are allowed to change – whether using the World Bank crite-
rion, the HDI, or any other such measure – this means that categorisations can vary from year to
year. This requires us to think in a different way about “South” and “North”: instead of being
places, they become statistical constructs.
A further problem with changeable classiﬁcations of developmental level is that they increase the
amount of variance in the results. In different years, ﬁndings on countries in each category will be
based on different groups of countries. Those close to category boundaries will have the least stable
classiﬁcations (we saw in Figure 3 how the reclassiﬁcation of South Korea as an HIC drastically
reduced migrant density in this group of countries). To reduce this “noise” it would be necessary
to smooth out short-term ﬂuctuations, so that rapid changes in (for example) exchange rates and
commodity prices do not lead to frequent reclassiﬁcations. This suggests that it might be desirable
to use an indicator that is less sensitive to external ﬂuctuations and more focused on an economy’s
intrinsic strength.
In its recent publications, UNDESA seems to be placing increasing emphasis on World Bank
classiﬁcations. They are referred to extensively in the two most recent International Migration
Reports (UNDESA 2016, 2017c), while the MD/LD dichotomy is hardly mentioned at all. World
Bank categories are also used to disaggregate the data presented in UNDESA’s 2017 Revision of
international migrant stock (UNDESA, 2017a); they were already used in the Wallchart based on
the 2015 Revision (UNDESA, 2015). Importantly, however, the organisation does not allow classi-
ﬁcations of income level to change from year to year. Instead, the values for a reference year
(2014 for the Wallchart, 2016 for the 2017 Revision) are ascribed to each country for the entire
periods 1990-2015 and 1990-2017.
This hybrid method replaces the regional classiﬁcation – half a century old – with a more up-to-date
set of ﬁxed scores reﬂecting the situation in 2014 or 2016. The resulting ﬁndings are more stable than
would be the case if income levels were redeﬁned for each year studied; the method could be seen as
combining the advantages of the traditional regional classiﬁcation with those of an economic one.
Developmental levels are ﬁxed for a long period, but on the basis of more up-to-date information.
Unfortunately this method creates considerable distortions, which become greater as the number
of years between the reference date and the actual date increases. A country is treated as “high-
income” in 1990 if it reached that level a quarter of a century later: its actual income in 1990 is
ignored. This introduces inaccuracies that render data for all but the most recent years misleading.
This is particularly unfortunate because UNDESA uses not just two World Bank categories, but all
four; the results could have been very useful, because the LMIC category covers a wide range of
income levels and these may not change over time in the same way. Using UNDESA’s hybrid
method shows that migration density actually increases in the “upper-middle” income category but
decreases in the “lower-middle” and “low” categories. However, we were unable to replicate these
results when we re-analysed the data using the true income levels for each year, mainly because of
the increased variability of the resulting scores.
Nevertheless, over a shorter time-span – say 5 or 10 years – a ﬁxed classiﬁcation of income
level, based for example on average GNI over the whole period, might provide an acceptable com-
promise. Further research is needed to discover the best solution.
Other methodological shortcomings of data on development and migration
So far, we have demonstrated that taking account of population size and adopting an economic cri-
terion of development yields quite different results from those found using absolute ﬁgures and the
traditional regional criterion. This is not to say, however, that these methodological improvements
suddenly open a window on the truth. Several other shortcomings exist in the available data that
can also distort research ﬁndings, particularly in developing countries. We will describe the most
10 Ingleby, Singleton and Wickramage
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serious of these one by one, considering ﬁnally whether they might account for our main ﬁndings,
which are that migrant density in LMICs is very low and declines steadily between 1990 and 2010
(or 2015 if refugees are excluded from the analysis).
Irregular migration
The article of Ratha and Shaw (2007: 2) argued that “irregular migration is probably even more
common in South-South than South-North migration because of tight restrictions on immigration in
many developing countries, coupled with limited enforcement, the high cost of travel documents,
and unclear immigration rules in the South.” To this could be added that a relative lack of regula-
tion in developing countries tends to go hand in hand with large informal economies, which favour
irregular migration because of the lack of inspection and supervision of work and trade (factors, of
course, that also increase migrants’ vulnerability to exploitation and human-rights violations). But
would including irregular migrants alter our conclusions?
Irregular migration has become a major research topic in recent years, but estimating the numbers
of migrants involved is the hardest type of study to carry out and is done by very few researchers:
to a large extent, the volume of irregular migration is a “black box”. We have very little reliable
information about its volume, whether it is increasing or decreasing over time, and its economic
effects. In particular, we cannot say for sure whether it is more common in the South than the
North (however these are deﬁned), and whether the rate of change differs between the two. Never-
theless, it remains possible that including irregular migrants, if it could be done, would alter the
ﬁndings reported here.
Limited resources for collection of population statistics
Much migration in poorer countries may go uncounted because of the incompleteness of population
registers and censuses. These data sources are usually available, but they sometimes do not make it
possible to disaggregate migrants and non-migrants. Improving data sources on migration is therefore
the ﬁrst objective of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (UN, 2018).
Inconsistent criteria for identifying migrants
Legislation and data-registration practices concerning the criterion used for establishing migrant sta-
tus (e.g. nationality or country of birth) vary greatly. Both of these criteria can be useful for partic-
ular purposes: ideally both should be available. Migrants who become naturalised cease to be
foreigners but remain foreign-born, so that the citizenship criterion usually yields lower numbers of
migrants than country of birth. Less commonly, a bias in the opposite direction is created when
children of migrants born in a country that applies jus sanguine rather than jus solis are given the
nationality of their parents.
The method used to establish migrant status in each country (country of birth, citizenship, both,
or “imputation”) is reported by UNDESA in its migration data. In the 2017 Revision, 91% of coun-
tries in MD regions used country of birth, whereas in LD regions this ﬁgure was only 77%. Both
methods were used in three LD countries; imputation was used in six, which were equally divided
between the two regions.
Neglect of short-term migration
Almost all recorded data on migration concerns only “long-term” migration, deﬁned by UNDESA
(1998) as involving actual or intended stays of one year or more. “Short-term” migration (between
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3 and 12 months) is therefore almost invisible in ofﬁcial statistics. Residence permits can give an
indication of a migrant’s length of stay, but not always an accurate one: a short-term permit may
be converted to a long-term one, a migrant may leave the country before their permit expires, or
they may fail to leave after it has expired or become invalid (“overstaying”).
It is probably safe to say that short-term migration is more likely when the distance involved is
relatively short; the ease with which a visa can be obtained will also make a difference. For exam-
ple, European Union citizens do not require a visa to migrate within the Union, which should in
principle encourage short-term migration. Conversely, the introduction of restrictive immigration
policies may encourage migrants to lengthen their stay, for fear of not being allowed back in if
they leave: Penninx (2013) describes how the clampdown on labour migration following the oil cri-
sis in Europe in the 1970s encouraged many “guest workers” not to return to their home countries,
but instead to invite their families to join them (see also De Haas et al., 2018). However, reliable
data about short-term migration remain extremely scarce.
Migrant stocks versus ﬂows
Figures for migrant stock may include migrants who settled in a country many years, or even dec-
ades, earlier: if used to indicate current ﬂows, they can give a seriously distorted picture. Moreover,
changes in migrant stock reﬂect “net” migration, that is they aggregate inﬂow and outﬂow. A more
accurate impression can be obtained by considering only recently-arrived migrants or by examining
annual migration ﬂows, but such data are relatively scarce (IOM, 2018).
What implications do these ﬁve problems have for our ﬁndings? Speciﬁcally, could any of them
undermine our main conclusion (that migrant density in LMICs is very low and decreases over
time) by providing a plausible alternative explanation?
a) A high level of irregular migration in LMICs would lead to undercounting of migrants and lower
migrant density. The question is whether this level is higher in LMICs than in HICs, and
whether the gap increases in time; unfortunately, this question cannot currently be answered.
b) Limited information about migrant stocks is more of a problem in LD countries, although the
situation is improving. Lack of information will obviously lead to undercounting of migrants in
such countries, but this reduction should become less, rather than more, over time.
c) Use of the citizenship criterion instead of country of birth, which as we saw is more common in
LD countries, might also lead to undercounting of migrants. However, the method countries used
remains the same for the whole period 1990-2015, so changes found over time cannot be
explained in this way.
d) Unfortunately, there seem to be no data that would tell us whether short-term migration (which
is not recorded in ofﬁcial statistics) is more common in LMICs than HICs, and whether this dif-
ference in increasing or decreasing.
e) When migrant stocks are studied instead of migration ﬂows, the inability to distinguish recently-
arrived from longer-established migrants means that the ability to detect an increase or decrease
will be reduced. Changes may be taking place more rapidly than our methods permit us to see.
Summing up, issues 1 – 4 could all lead to underestimation of migrant stocks in LMICs, so they
might provide alternative explanations for the low ﬁgures that have been reported. However, it is
questionable whether these errors are large enough to account for differences as great as the ones
reported here. In 2015, migrant density in HICs was on average nine times higher than in LMICs.
Even if we assume – for the sake of argument – that there are no uncounted migrants in HICs, to
bring the migrant density in LMICs up to the level of HICs there would have to be eight
uncounted migrants for each one that is counted. The shortcomings of data collection in LMICs
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discussed above hardly seem capable of rendering invisible such a large number of migrants; they
also seem incapable of explaining away a decrease in migrant density in LMICs over time.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
When the “South” is deﬁned in terms of UNDESA’s regional criterion, both absolute numbers of
migrants and migrant density are seen to have increased, along with South-South migration. This
ﬁnding has been enthusiastically welcomed by international organisations (see e.g. IOM, 2014;
UNDP, 2017) because it suggests that the potential beneﬁts of migration are becoming more avail-
able to developing regions. The enthusiasm is connected with a recent reappraisal of the role of
migration in development (De Haas, 2005). Whereas twentieth-century theories often viewed migra-
tion as having chieﬂy disadvantages (such as “brain drain”) for sending countries, in the present
century it has come to be viewed as a “win-win” situation, especially because of the high volume
of remittances sent home by migrants. If new migration destinations are emerging in the South, this
increases the opportunities for migrants in that region and promotes development in their countries
of origin.
Other potential beneﬁts seen in South-South migration are that distances and cultural differ-
ences between sending and receiving countries may be smaller, thus encouraging short-term
migration (which would reduce the stress of separation for migrants and their families) and facili-
tating integration. South-South migration also promises to relieve the perceived pressure on tradi-
tional countries of immigration in UNDESA’s “North”. In many of these countries, political
opposition to migrants and “migrant-friendly” policies has increased since the turn of the century;
rising numbers of migrants are often framed as a threat to national security and political stability.
Finally, the impression that South-South migration is greater than South-North and increasing has
led some to suggest that the traditional distinction between sending and receiving countries is
eroding.
It is certainly true that an increasing amount of migration takes place within global regions
(UNDESA 2016:16). However, if poorer countries are starting to look like richer ones, this is
only because the two have been mixed up with each other in the datasets. Wealthy destination
countries like Singapore and Qatar are classiﬁed by UNDESA as LD, simply because of where
they are located. In reality, migrants are indeed heading for new destinations in the LD regions,
but the wealthy countries to which most of them are going are few and far between: as men-
tioned above, in 2015 these countries housed only 2% of the non-migrant population of LD
regions. Their rapid economic development is highly exceptional. It would therefore be quite
wrong to think that poor countries are becoming more like rich ones in their volume of immi-
gration. On the contrary, using the World Bank’s economic classiﬁcation shows migrant density
in LMICs to be very low and declining, particularly when refugees are excluded from consider-
ation. (Notwithstanding the arguments of Betts et al. (2014), forced migrants and their families
are unlikely to be able to make the same contribution to the receiving country’s prosperity as
other types of migrant.)
If ﬁndings based on the UNDESA criterion were hailed as good news, our ﬁndings using the
World Bank criterion – which contradict them in most respects – will probably be regarded as bad
news. Using an economic criterion shows that the gap between rich and poor countries in terms of
migrant density is getting larger, not smaller. In one respect, however, the news remains good: the
emergence of new destination countries in several regions is indeed broadening the opportunities
available to migrants.
As was always the case, most migration (except when it is forced) takes place to countries that
can offer better economic opportunities than one’s own. That wealthy countries can increasingly be
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found in one’s own region should therefore be good news for everybody: a crucial issue for pol-
icy-makers is then how to encourage more of it. Although some countries in LD regions have
become prosperous and are attracting more migrants, the number of countries housing a given pro-
portion of the world’s migrants is staying remarkably constant (cf. UNDESA 2016:8). The potential
beneﬁts of migration are being limited by the fact that surprisingly little diversiﬁcation of receiving
countries is taking place, in contrast to the great diversiﬁcation of sending countries.
This theme has been explored by Czaika and De Haas (2015), who speak of more migrants being
“funnelled” into fewer destination countries. Whether the number is actually fewer, or simply stay-
ing the same, is not clear; our ﬁgures (sourced from UNDESA) show that overall, the distribution
of migrants over countries stayed remarkably similar between 1990 and 2015. During this entire
period, the number of countries housing two-thirds of all migrants (excluding refugees) varied
between 16 and 18; for those housing 75% of all migrants, it varied between 25 and 26. This
seems to conﬁrm that as Czaika and De Haas put it, migrants are not “fanning out” to new destina-
tion countries: it seems as though something is impeding the development of new migration corri-
dors.
What could be doing this? Apart from the familiar “push” and “pull” factors such as oppor-
tunities in the destination country and lack of them in the country of origin, two other factors
are very important determinants of migration ﬂows: the existence of relatively permissive
immigration policies in the destination country, and of a diaspora (i.e. people from the
migrant’s own country). After the ﬁrst migrants have led the way, informal networks can stimu-
late others to join them, as well as helping them to travel and to “land on their feet” when
they arrive.
A limitation of traditional bilateral agreements is that they usually aim only to build up and
improve existing migration corridors, not to create new ones. Typically, they are based on factors
such as previous (sometimes colonial) ties, linguistic afﬁnity and economic links. They follow
migration patterns, but do not usually create them.
Regional agreements (of which there are already at least 11 world-wide) are in principle better
able than bilateral ones to encourage diversiﬁcation of destination countries. One example is of
course the European Union, which guarantees freedom of movement to Member States for EU citi-
zens, subject to certain conditions. Interestingly, despite this freedom, migrants from “third coun-
tries” (4.2% of the population in 2017 according to Eurostat) are nonetheless more numerous in the
EU than EU migrants (3.3%) – though the difference might be the other way around if short-term
migration were included.
To promote diversiﬁcation, regional agreements should focus not only on the migration corridors
that exist, but – even more so – on those that could exist but do not yet. (Of course, very large
countries such as China, Brazil and India, as well as some smaller ones, will continue to be able to
ﬁll most labour shortages through internal migration.) In order to “prime the pump” for interna-
tional migration, regional agreements should create special incentives for the pathbreakers, offering
them special help with language learning, integration, etcetera. Later, after a corridor has been
established, the new diaspora will be able to give intending migrants a helping hand.
Migration can be compared with irrigation: if a dry ﬁeld is irrigated only at one point, water
will ﬁnd its way down a small number of channels, which will then become progressively dee-
per. This can result in most of the ﬁeld remaining dry. What is required is a mechanism to
ensure that channels are created that reach all parts of the ﬁeld. It would be unwise to expect
economic growth alone to do this: all the signs are that the spectacular growth in many develop-
ing countries at the beginning of this century was a temporary phenomenon. If new migration
corridors are proactively encouraged, all countries in a region that can in principle beneﬁt from
migration will be able to do so. Policies therefore need to be developed that will widen the
range of receiving countries that are attractive to migrants. To this end, new research is required
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going beyond the global level studied here and focusing on speciﬁc regions, migration corridors
and types of migration.
CONCLUSION
The need for adequate and unambiguous data is especially urgent at the present moment, when
migration policy is receiving more attention than ever from politicians, policy-makers and the
media. Much of this attention is focused on two landmark agreements: the Global Compact for
safe, orderly and regular migration (UN, 2018) and the Global Compact on Refugees (UNHCR,
2018). The Sustainable Development Goals (UNDP, 2016) also include speciﬁc targets on migra-
tion (10.7), the need for disaggregated data (17.18), and many other migration-related issues. There
is widespread agreement that policy-making must be based on solid empirical evidence rather than
opinions and rhetoric. In this article we have described a number of reasons for thinking that the
evidence base currently being relied on is much less solid than it needs to be. We hope this will
result in a more critical attitude to using existing migration data, as well as increased efforts to col-
lect better data.
NOTES
1. In this article we follow the United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration,
Revision 1 (UNDESA, 1998) in deﬁning an international migrant as any person who changes his or her
country of usual residence. An international migrant who changes his or her place of usual residence for at
least one year is deﬁned as a long-term migrant, while a person who changes his or her place of usual resi-
dence for more than three months but less than one year is considered to be a short-term migrant.
2. For three reasons, discrepancies can exist between the ﬁgures reported here and by UNDESA.
a) UNDESA lists about 2 million refugees in the State of Palestine, who are however not included in the
total for migrants. Although these persons have been granted a special form of refugee status, in terms of
the standard deﬁnition they are not refugees because they have not crossed a national border. They are
therefore not included as refugees in our analyses.
b) Although Taiwan is not included in the UNDESA list of countries, its population is nevertheless added
each year to the totals for East Asia and the world, as well as for ‘upper-middle income countries’ and
LMICs. No ﬁgures for migrants and refugees are added. In our analyses no data from Taiwan are used.
c) We have excluded all data from Montenegro and South Sudan between 1990 and 2005, because no totals
for migrants and refugees were available for those countries.
3. In UNDESA databases asylum seekers are counted as ‘refugees’, despite the fact that many of them never
obtain a residence permit. Figures for recognised refugees in industrialised countries are estimated using a
formula developed by UNDESA, since most such countries do not register them separately.
4. Results for 2013 using the World Bank’s classiﬁcation were based on GNI levels for 2014; they show an
abrupt rise for South-North migration and a fall for South-South. This illustrates the vulnerability of the
GNI measure to short-term economic ﬂuctuations. In 2014, the Russian Federation and Venezuela were
classiﬁed brieﬂy as HICs, but both fell back to the LMIC category in 2015 because of falling prices for oil
and natural gas, currency changes and other issues. Because of Russia’s large migrant population (11 mil-
lion), this caused the gap between South-North and South-South migration to suddenly become much wider
in that year. If these countries had stayed in the LMIC category, our calculations show that the brown and
blue lines in Figure 7 would have been much less crooked. Once again, this strengthens the argument for
“smoothing” World Bank classiﬁcations when they are used to study migration.
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